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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. VANCE, D.O. ) 
) 
Appellant and Plaintiff, } PETITION FOR REHEARING 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
PAUL T. FORDHAM, Director of ) 
the Department of Registration, ) 
DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION and ) 
THE OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE, ) No. 18176 
} 
Respondent and Defendants. } 
******************************** 
COMES NOW the Appellant, by and through his attorney of 
record, M. Richard Walker, and pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 76 (e}, hereby petitions the Court for a 
rehearing· in the above entitled matter, based upon the 
following points wherein it is alleged that this Court has 
erred: 
POINT I. 
POINT II. 
POINT III. 
POINT l:V. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE LICENSE OF 
AN OSTEOPATH TO BE REVOKED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW REGARDING APPEALS FOR 
OSTEOPATHS. 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS ERRED IN APPLYING THE 
STANDARDS REQUIRED OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY ACTING 
IN A "LEGISL'ATIVE" 1 OR "ADMINISTRATIVE" FUN CTI ON 1 
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY (OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE} 
WHICH WAS ACTING IN A "JUDICIAL" FUNCTION. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO VERIFY THAT 
SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF THE FINDINGS BY THE 
COMMITTEE WERE UNSUPPORTED BY ANY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
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POINT V. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ERRED BY FAILING AS A COURT 
OF EQUITY TO ASSURE THE GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW TO WHICH APPELLANT IS GUARANTEED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION. 
This petition is supported by appellant's brief of the 
authorities relied upon to sustain the points listed herein, 
with ten copies of said brief being filed herewith. 
DATED this /'2..- day of Septie~ 
M. RICHARD WALKER 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Plaintiff 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing and two 
(2) copies of Appellant's Brief, to Steven Schwendiman, 
Assistant Utah Attorney General, Attorney for Respondent, 
Defendant, at 236 State Capitol Build;~,91fsa!~ Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid on this /~~~983. 
---
M. RICHARD WALKER 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Plaintiff 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Thi s matte r i n v o 1 v es the rev o cat ion o f the App e 11 an t • s 
professional license to practice as an OSTEOPATH. The 
Department of Registration, after hearing before a purported 
committee, revoked said license on February 2, 1981, for 
UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, under the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated 1952 Section 58-1-(7-~). The revocation was appealed 
to the Third Judicial District Court and that Court, construing 
the appeal to be under Section 58-12-35.1, of the Medical 
Practices Act, instructed the parties to file briefs and 
thereafter sustained the revocation by the Department of 
Reg i strati on. 
The Appellant filed the appeal herein and on August 22, 
1983, this Court issued it's opinion affirming the judgment of 
the District Court, revoking the Appellant's professional 
license. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant herein petitions the Court for rehearing, 
based upon the grounds that this Court has erred in several 
substantive areas, resulting in a totally wrongful revocation 
and permanent denial of Appellant's right constitutional rights 
afforded by due process of law, and has failed to distinguish 
the difference between the statutory requirements applicable to 
Osteopaths (DO' s) as opposed to Medical Doctors (MD' s). For 
these substantial errors the Appellant petitions this Court for 
rehearing to allow these and others hereafter enumerated errors 
to be corrected, before the Department of registration is 
a 11 owed to tot a 11 y destroy the App e 11 ant ' s pro fess ion a 1 
practice and ability to earn a living and support his family, 
and to provide critical medical care to the hundreds of 
patients who depend upon his treatments in preventative medical 
care. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VANCE VS. FORDHAM, No. 18176 
Page 2, PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant Dr. Robert B. Vance, is an Osteopathic 
physician and surgeon, licensed to practice as an OSTEOPATH 
(commonly referred to as a "DO"), under the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 Section 58-12-7 which in 1981 was ~mended 
to the present Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 58-12-(1-7), 
the "Osteopathic Medical Licensing Act". In Contrast however, 
Medical Doctors (commonly referred to as "MD's" are licensed 
under the provisions of the "UTAH MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT" Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 Section 58-12-(26-40), which act 
specifically "does not apply to the regulation of the other 
heali_ng arts," (Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 58-12-38, only 
to regulation of MD' s) • 
The original complaint against the Appellant, charged that 
the Department had power to suspend or revoke pursuant to the 
terms of Section 58-1-25 (1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 [Record 
p.112>], although wrongfully then referring to Utah Code Annotated 
1953 Section 58-12-36(15) for its definition of "unprofessional 
conduct" (which applies to MD's), rather than to Section 
58-12-18 which applies to Osteopaths. 
After the hearing. the Osteopathic committee,· wrongfully 
concluded: 
Based 
"The Respondent Robert B. Vance is 
the provisions of Section 58-12-36(15) 
Annotated • • • • " [Re co rd f>. n·2- ] 
subject to 
Utah Code 
upon said findings and conclusions the Department 
Registration issued its order of revocation on February 
1981. [Record p. 169] 
It is true that Appellant's former counsel filed 
of 
6, 
its 
notice of appeal in the District Court referring to it as an 
appeal under Section 58-12-35.1 of the "Medical Practice Act", 
because the revocation order was wrongfully designated to be 
under that act. 
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However, the Appellant was charged under Section 
58-1-25 (1) being the general regulating provisions of the 
licensing of professionals for OSTEOPATHS, and the only 
recourse to the Courts in that appl i cable chapter is under 
Section 58-1-36. No erroneous reference made by the Department 
of Registration or Appellant's prior attorney, can alter the 
statutory mandate. 
Nevertheless, the error has been allowed to stand 
uncorrected by the Courts. 
The Third District Court construed the matter to be only 
an appeal under the MD' s Medical Practice Act, instructed the 
parties to file briefs and then made its affirming decision, 
overlooking all of the constitutional safeguards provided for 
OSTEOPATHS by the laws of this State. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE LICENSE OF AN 
OSTEOPATH TO BE REVOKED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE MEDICAL 
PRACTICE ACT, WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO MD's. 
It is apparent from the published opinion that this 
honorable Court has failed to distinguish that an OSTEOPATH is 
involved in a different branch of the healing arts, than MD's. 
The Osteopath is trained in different colleges, different modes 
of practice and is licensed with a completely different license 
than an MD. The provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 
58-12-7 provide specifically for the licensing of Osteopathic 
Physician and Surgeons wherein it is provided: 
"OSTEOPATHS--As Physician and Surgeon. An applicant 
desiring to practice as an osteopathic physician and 
surgeon must be a graduate of an osteopathic college 
reputable and in good standing at the time of his 
graduation, requiring as a prerequisite to 
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graduation a four year residence course of 
instruction over a period of four school years, 
• " etc. 
The act then goes on to 1 i st qualifications for obstetrics, 
treatment without drugs or surgery and in Section 58-12-14 
provides for applicants in "any school or system of treating 
human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and 
without operative surgery •.• " the act specifically 
footnoting such other professions as chiropractors, masseurs, 
domestic or family remedies, optometrists or others. 
With relationships to those branchses of the healing arts, 
unprofessional conduct is defined in Section 58-12-18. 
However with regard to MD's, the MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT of 
1969 was passed by the legislature as: 
An act relating to the practice of medicine; and 
prescribing the basis for the obtaining of a license 
to practice medicine; providing a definition for 
"unprofessional conduct" as it relates to the 
practice of medicine; EXCEPTING members of OTHER 
HEALING ARTS and PROFESSIONS." (Emphasis Added) See 
footnote to Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 
58-12-26. 
The Medical Practice Act specifically provides for the 
licensing and regulating of MD's, and as provided in: 
"58-12-38, MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT--SCOPE OF 
ACT--THE UTAH MEDICAL PRACTICES ACT is designed 
solely for the regulation of the practice of medicine 
AND DOES NOT APPLY to the regulation of the 
other healing arts, to the extent authorized by the 
practitioners license • and this act shall· not 
change or limit the rights of persons lawfully 
practicing the other healing arts with respect to the 
practice of their professions AS PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED 
BY LAW • • • • " (Emphasis Added) • 
A cursory reading of the Medical Practice Act makes clear 
that it applies to licensing and regulation of MD's ands 
excludes the "other healing arts," including OSTEOPATHS, 
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NATUROPATHS, PSYCHOLOGISTS, CHIROPRACTORS, because they are 
regulated elsewhere. 
The legislature made this abundantly clear when in 1981 
upon the demise of the Osteopath Licensing provisions by virtue 
of the Sunset Laws, passed the "Utah Osteopathic Medicine 
Licensing Act" as Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 58-12-(1-7) 
replacing the prior licensing provisions and redefining 
"unprofessional conduct" for Osteopaths. 
At no time have OSTEOPATHS ever been licensed, regulated 
or censured under the MD's, Medical Practice Act, until the 
instant case. It is wrong, it is error, and it is a total 
violation of the· Appellant's right of due process, to charge 
him with revocation under the provisions of Section 58-1-25 
applicable to the "other healing arts," and then revoke his 
license under the Medical Practice Act," which applies only to 
MD's, and determine that his right of review by the Courts is 
governed thereby. 
The Appellant is entitled to know that the laws defining 
unprofessional ·conduct for Osteopaths and the other healing 
arts, namely Section 58-12-18 (which was the law at the date of 
the hearing), is the standard required of him, unless other or 
additional standards have been published by the Department of 
Registration, upon recommendation of the Osteopathic committee 
as required by Section 58-1-13. 
Respondent's own memorandum in support of revocation, 
dated October 20, 1981, acknowledges the committee acted under 
Section 58-1-7, 8 and a held the hearing under Section 58-1-26 
[Record P· 152.. ] , but the Department then found unprofessional 
conduct, under the provisions of a totally different act, ie. 
"The Medical Practice Act", which applies to MD's, not to 
OSTEOPATHS. 
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POINT II. 
The Supreme Court ERRED by affirming the erroneous 
interpretation of the law regarding appeals for OSTEOPATHS. 
The action by the Department of Registration was clearly 
erroneous. Had the Appellant, an Osteopath been subject to the 
Medical Practices Act, then he should have been charged under 
section 58-12-35.1, which clearly defines the procedures for 
the "BOARD", ie. the MD's licensing board, to conduct hearings. 
However, this was not done because the board referred to in 
Section 58-12-35.1 is a board of MD's, and further the hearing 
required by Section 58-12-35.1 is to be: 
" ••• before the director and the board." 
This clearly was not done. Appellant was not charged under the 
"Medical Practices Act", but under Section 58-1-(25-27) and the 
hearing was conducted 
provided by Title 58 
before the purported committee, as 
Chapter 1. Chapter 1 thereafter 
designates 'the ONLY recourse to the Courts for OSTEOPATHS and 
the other healing arts as: 
58-1-36. RECOURSE TO THE COURTS.--Any applicant 
for or holder of a license, certificate, permit, 
student or apprentice card or any person directly 
affected and aggrieved by any ruling of the 
department of registration, may within thirty days 
after notice of such ruling institute an action in 
the district court of the county at the seat of 
government, or in the county of the aggrieved 
person's residence, against the director in his 
official capacity setting out his grievance and his 
right to complain. In his answer the director may 
set out any matter in justification; and the court 
shall determine the issues on both questions of law 
and fact and may affirm, set aside or modify the 
ruling complained of. 
That Section defines the only recourse to the Courts for a 
member of the "other healing arts". It is not a matter of 
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choice, and the fact that, (1) the Department of Registration 
wrongfully referred to the revocation as being under section 
58-12-36 or (2) the former attorneys for Appellant referred to 
their appeal as being under Section 58-12-35.1; the law is 
clear and provides that the "Medical Practices Act" regulates 
MD's, and excludes the other healing arts. Osteopaths and 
other members of the healing arts were at that time charged 
with unprofessional conduct standards, as defined in Section 
58-12-18, subject to revocation proceedings under Section 
58-1-25 and entitled to recourse to the Courts under Section 
58-1-36. 
To rule otherwise is not only erroneous be denies the 
Appellant the kind of judicial review required by statute and 
guaranteed by due process. 
POINT III. 
The Supreme Court has erred in applying the standards 
required of an administrative body acting in a "legislative", 
or "administrative" function, to the administrative body 
(Osteopathic Committee) which was acting in a "judicial" 
function. 
The law applicable to administrative bodies is clear that 
such tribunal is a creature of statute and therefore can only 
be vested with the power speci~ically granted by the act 
creating it. In re Whitmer, in and for Salt Lake County, 515 
P2d 617, 30 Utah 2d 206(1973). Accordingly such administrative 
bodies MUST find within the creating statute, warrant for the 
exercise of any authority they claim. The Osteopathic 
Committee is created under Sect ion 58-1-6 with its specific 
authority detailed in the provisions of Title 58, Chapter 1. 
It is NOT created under the "Medical Practice Act", the body 
created there is the (MD's) Medical Licensing Board. The 
Osteopathic Committee cannot exercise powers enumerated under 
the "Medical Practice Act". 
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"Official powers cannot be merely 
can they be created by the Court in 
exercise of their judicial functions." 
1 Am Jur 2d Section 70 at page 867. 
assumed nor 
the proper 
The Supreme Court in its August 22, 1983 opinion, at page 9, 
cited the case of Hussey v. Smith, 99 US 20, 24 (1878), 
upholding the principle of, authority vesting in a de facto 
officer, and quoting Freeman on Judgments Sect. 148 to 
cone 1 ude: 
"The acts of such officers are held to be valid 
because the public good requires it. THE PRINCIPLE 
WRONGS NO ONE. A different rule would be a source of 
serious and lasting evils." (Emphasis Added) 
However, that 
administrative 
very citation differentiates the usual 
tribunals which act in legislative or 
administrative functions, or such as existed in the case of In 
re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 87 P 103(1927), wherein a 
fully qualified District Judge was deemed to be qualified, DE 
FACTO, to sit on the Supreme Court. There the principle wrongs 
case the principle CLEARLY no one. However, in the instant 
wrongs the very person whose professional life is at stake. 
The App e 11 ant , by the prov is ions of the statutory 
safeguards, was assured that if revocation proceedings were 
instituted, he was guaranteed to have a hearing before a 
committee of three Osteopaths, 
"EACH MEMBER of a committee MUST have had a 
license to practice in this State for a period of 
FIVE YEARS immediately prior to his appointment • 
" Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 58-1-6 
This Court's opinion acknowledges the defect but errs, in 
inferring that it really doesn't matter because that five year 
requirement has since been· omitted. (Footnote 2 to Supreme 
Court's opinion.) 
The clear purpose of the 
assure those whose professional 
five year requirement was to 
life is at stake, that their 
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judges (the committee) will all have been practicing in this 
State for at least five years to become knowledgeable with 
regard to the standards of practice in this State. This 
Co u r t ' s opinion ignores that most c r i tic a 1 due process 
requirement. 
This Courts decision cites numerous cases, most of which 
involve administrative agencies in the exercise of legislative 
or administrative powers. However, 
Where a statute enpowers an agency to revoke a 
license for non-compliance with or violation of 
agency regulations the administrative act is of a 
JUDICIAL nature since it depends upon the 
as cert a i nm en t of the ex i st enc e o f cert a i n par t o r 
present facts upon which a decision is to be made and 
rights and liabilities determined. 
1 Am Jur 2d Section 181, p. 983 
While this Courts decision cites the rules of disqualification 
for conflict of interest, lack of appointment etc., all 
intended as a rule of necessity,· to carry out the legislative 
intent. However, in this case, the legislature had clearly 
mandated that no such person (without five years of practice in 
this State) could serve as a member of the committee, and the 
legislature clearly empowered the Department of Regulation to 
appoint members within those strict requirements, but the 
decision of this Court would uphold an act of the department 
which violates the clear mandate of the legislature, and 
violates the safeguards of due process to which Appellant is 
entitled, when it is his very professional life at the mercy of 
a wrongful appointment by the Director of the Department of 
Registration, and an improper committee acting in a judicial 
capacity in violation of the legislative requirements. 
The Appellant's challenge of the committee is a challenge 
to JURISDICTION. Whether a tribunal has jurisdiction of a 
cause is of such primary and fundamental importance that, an 
overwhelming majority of Courts, have ruled that a ~hallenge to 
jurisdiction may be raised at ANY TIME. 
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Schuler-Knox Co. v. Smith, 14Ll P 2d 47 63 C.A. 2d 86 
( 1944); Tuebelhorn v. Turyanski, 370 P2d 757, 149 Colo 558 
(1962); Board of Sup' rs of Maricopa County v. Woodall, 586 P2d 
640, 120 Ariz. 391 (1978); In Interest of Wellard, 541 P2d 621, 
97 Idaho 197 (1975); Memhold v. Clark County School District 
Board of School Trustees, 506 P2d 420, 89 Nev 56, Cert denied 
94 s. Ct. 247, 414 u. s. 943, 38 L. Ed. 2d 167, (1973); Hunter 
v. Department of Labor and Industries, 576 P2d 69, 19 Wash App 
473 (1978). 
The osteopathic Committee was never duly constituted and 
therefore could not acquire jurisdiction over the subject 
matter or the person and any action by this purported committee 
should be held to be void. 
POINT IV. 
The SUPREME COURT ERRED by failing to verify that 
substantial portions of the FINDINGS by the COMMITTEE were 
unsupported by ANY competent evidence. 
The Findings and Conclusions of the Osteopathic Committee 
were adopted by the Department as a basis for revocation. 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings provide: 
"Inasmuch as Chelation Therapy is not accepted 
among medical standards as a proper treatment for 
Atherosclerosis in the United States, it should not 
be prescribed as such by a physician in general 
practice." 
Not a single witness gave competent testimony that Chelation 
Therapy is not accepted among practitioners in the United 
States. Only Dr. Alan J. Concors D.O. (a one month Utah 
practitioner) testified in the most blatant hearsay testimony 
as follows: 
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"Yes, that the position of the Chairman of the 
Department of Ethics for the Osteopathic General 
Practitioners College, is that as far as he was 
concerned, and the majority of the profession is 
that they would stand behind any denouncing of thi~ 
type of treatment and management." [Record p. P02] 
However Dr. Concors, in regard to Chelation Therapy, after 
testifying disqualified himself as an expert on Chelation 
stating: 
"As far as its treatment in the use of every day 
general practice, and especially on an out patient 
basis, I HAVE just never read anywhere in the 
literature. I have never read any text on it. And I 
have never come across it in any medical journals, 
either DC or MD. I've never heard it discussed at 
any medical conventions. And I know for a fact that 
its not taught at any medical schools or osteopathic 
medical schools.: [Record p. 804] 
Yet after admission of his lack of knowledge or expertise 
regarding Chelation Therapy, concluded its administration could 
be dangerous to the heal th of an individual. 
Line 11]. 
(Record p. 8 04 
Contrary to Dr. Concor's biased and unqualified testimony, 
three eminently qualified physicians Dr. Halstead, Dr. Gordon 
and Dr. Gerber, testified that Dr. Vance's methodology and 
treatments were totally acceptable within the standards of 
practice, that Dr. Vance is highly qualified, a diplomate in 
the American Society of Medical Preventics which teaches and 
certifies the use of Chelation Therapy (as used by Dr. Vance) 
among several hundred Dr.' s both MD and DO throughout the 
United States. [Record - Dr. Gordon p. 623; Dr. Halstead p. 
1110-1174; Dr. Gerber p. 1007-1104] 
or. Concors was the only Dr. who testified that Chelation 
Therapy was not an acceptable mode of treatment. His hearsay 
was never corroborated by any evidence or other testimony. 
The r e f o re , by the e v i d en t i a r y s ta n d a rd a n no u n c e d by the 
administrative law Judge, Dr. Concors hearsay testimony cannot 
sustain a finding. 
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" The r u 1 es he re do spec i fi ca 11 y perm i t he a rs a y 
ev i den c e , but they a do pt wh a t ' s ca 11 e d the res id u i m 
rule, which means that hearsay evidence alone can't 
be used to substantiate a finding of fact. In other 
words there must be some competent evidence which 
corroborates the hearsay in order for the board to 
reach a finding." [Record p. 4] 
No other testimony was introduced, except the Appellant's 3 
expert witnesses who testified as to its great benefit, 
efficacy and beneficial use among hundreds of doctors in the 
united States, both MD and DO. Accordingly, finding no. 3 
regarding Chelation Therapy cannot be substantiated. In 
accordance with the ruling in the case of State v. Rogers 371 
South 2nd 1037 (1979) the Florida Supreme Court in refusing· to 
allow the medical board to restrict the use of Chelation 
Therapy stated: 
" in that regard it is relevant to note 
that neither BCMA, the hearing officer, nor the Board 
has made any findings that Chelation Therapy is in 
any respect harmful or hazardous to the patient. 
Rather, the Board's decision appears to have been 
b a s e d upon the He a r i n g Of f i c e r ' s ad mi n i st rat iv e· 
determination that Che la ti on Therapy is a 'quackery 
under the guise of scientific medicine •••• '" 
". • • We hold that under that provision of the 
Cons ti tut ion, in the absence of a demonstration of 
unlawfulness, harm, fraud, coercion or 
misrepresentation, Respondents Board is without 
authority to deprive Petitioner's patients of their 
voluntary election to receive Chelation Therapy 
simply because that mode of treatment has not 
received the endorsement of a majority of the medical 
profession. It necessarily follows that under such 
circumstances Respondents Board is without authority 
to pr oh i bit Petitioner from administering Chelation 
Therapy." 
That is the very circumstances involved here. The Committee 
did not find, as required by the statute that Chelation Therapy 
might constitute a danger to the health, welfare or safety of 
the patient or public, nor did the committee have one expert 
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testify that it was contrary to the recognized standards of 
ETHICS of the medical profession, with the single exception of 
the uncorroborated hearsay testimony of Dr. Concors, who 
at tempted to establish a nation wide stand a rd on a subject he 
knew nothing about and based on hearsay. Accordingly, the 
finding no. 3 of the committee that "Chelation Therapy is not 
accepted amo~g medical standards" is totally erroneous 
arbitrary and capricious and not a basis for revocation, even 
had there been such ev icence presented. The commit tee has 
s imply made a de term in at ion based on the i r own op i n ion , to 
reject Chelation Therapy beyond the guidelines of the statutory 
mandate. 
Finding number 4, concludes that "Laetrile (Amygdalin 
B-17) should not be prescribed in lieu of standard accepted 
medical treatment for a patient suffering from cancer". That 
finding is totally arbitrary and capricious and devoid of any 
supporting evidence whatsoever, and raises the most serious 
question of what constitutional authority does the State of 
Utah have to prohibit a non-harmful mode of medical treatment 
by a licensed physician, upon the election by the patient to 
receive the same? Such a finding by the committee is not only 
without any supportive evidence, but contrary to the testimony 
of three unrefuted experts, the fact that it has been 
specifically sanctioned for treatment of cancer patients in 24 
States, and in the decision of the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma, (cited in the Record at p. 
241-248). Its efficacy and use have not only been validated 
and approved, but a permanent restraining order issued against 
any restriction of its shipment in interstate commerce. That 
Court with regard to the use of Laetrile in the treatment of 
terminally ill cancer patients concluded: 
"The Appellate Court found the term 'safe' to 
have no rational application to a person considered 
terminally ill. (Rutherford v. United States, 582 
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F2d 1234, 1237 10th Circuit 1978) The Supreme Court 
thereafter provided guidance on the vitality of the 
term as it applies to terminally ill patients." 
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) 
That Court reasoned: 
" • the concept of safety under Section 201 
(p) (1) is not without meaning for terminal patients. 
Few if any drugs are completely safe in the sense 
that they may be taken by all persons in all 
circumstances without risk. For the terminally ill, 
as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential. 
for inflicting death or physical ·injury is not offset 
by the possibility of therapeutic benefit." 
442 U.S. at 555-556 
Regarding the proper interpretation of the term 
"effectiveness" the Court found: 
". • • •effectiveness' does not necessarily 
denote capacity to cure. In the treatment of any 
illness, terminal or otherwise, a drug is effective 
i f i t f ul f i 11 s , by obj e ct iv e i n d ices , i ts s pons o r ' s 
claims of prolonged life, improved physical 
condition, or reduced pain." See Fed Reg 39776-397A5 
(1977) 442 U.S. at 555. 
That Court then· found that after hearing extensive 
evidence and testimony from experts, that the National Cancer 
Institute, the FDA itself, and the Mayo Clinic have 
consistently stated that laetrile is a very safe substance, and 
concluded: 
"Based upon this and other evidence adduced at 
the recent hearings, this Court finds that the safety 
of laetrile or amygdalin is OVERWHELMING when 
compared with conventional anticancer drugs 
heretofore approved by the FDA for 'safety'". 
[Record 241-248] 
The committee finding is not only unsupported by any 
evidence or expert testimony, but it is totally refuted by the 
experts who did testify and the rulings of the various Federal 
Court rulings which have directly affirmed that laetrile is a 
"safe" drug for use in the treatment of cancer patients. 
Significantly, not one finding of the committee with 
regard to the Appellant's treatment of. patients, determined 
that any conduct or practice of the Appellant "does or might 
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constitute a danger to .the heal th, welfare or safety of the 
patient or the public, nor did the committee find any conduct, 
practice or condition which does or might impair the ability 
safely and skillfully to practice medicine as required by 
Section 58-12-36 (15) used by the committee as the standard. 
Therefore the. revocation must be for the only other provision 
of subparagraph (15) [although 58-12-36 (15) is not applicable 
to OSTEOPATHS], which is: 
"Any conduct or practice 
recognized STANDARDS OF ETHICS 
profession." (Emphas"TSAcra"ed) 
contrary to the 
of the medical 
Only one Osteopath, Dr. Alan Concors who had moved to Utah one 
month prior to the hearing, and was not even a member of the 
Utah Osteopathic Association, testified regarding the 
professional standards of the profession, although Dr. Concors 
admitted he knew nothing about Appellants mode of practice, had 
never read, nor heard of Chelation Therapy, he was willing to 
totally condemn Appellant. It seems very significant that Dr. 
Cancers practices with a group of MD' s in a family practice, 
not "preventative medicine" as the Appellant. Dr. Concors 
testimony was the sole basis for the committee's finding number 
5 as fol lows: 
"We find that Robert B. Vance diagnosed 
hypoglycemia too often without adequately ruling out 
other diseases or body dysfunctions." 
However, reading of the transcript makes clear that at no time, 
did Dr. Concors, as the sole witness to this finding, testify 
that Dr. Vance diagnosed hypoglycemia too often. The testimony 
was as follows: 
"Question. And do you have any o~inion as an expert, 
as to whether or not there is a proper procedure to 
have many, many, many---thousands, in fact in six 
years---2,000 patients who have been diagnosed as 
hypoglycemic? 
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Answer. I think its an over-diagnosed problem. 
Question. Some people d.o have the problem, but it 
sounds---with 2,000 patients being diagnosed, in the 
last six years sounds--
Answer. I would say that in the course of 16 years 
of a busy, active practice, and being associated with 
some of the higher centers of medical learning like 
the University of Miami, and Miami Heart Institute, 
and my association with other colleagues of both the 
M.D. and D.O. profession that I HAVE RUN INTO VERY 
FEW TRUE CASES OF HYPOGLYCEMIA." [Record 478] 
( Em p has i s Add e c ) 
His only conclusion, as 
over diagnosed problem. 
Appellant over diagnosed 
the questions by the 
an expert, was that he thinks its an 
At no time did he testify that the 
hypoglycemia. Only the innuendos from 
Departments attorney, inferred that 
Appellants 2,000 cases in six years was 
"many-many-many---thousands." [Record 478] No other testimony 
was introduced to support such a finding. 
ONLY in the case of FIVE patients was the diagnosis of 
hypoglycemia challenged. 
1. Jan Stevens, [Record p. 750]. There Dr. Rosenburg, 
the expert, testified from the wrong patients hypoglycemia 
test, and admitted he was not an expert on hypoglycemia. 
2. Milo Adams [Record 841]. The committee found all 
charges sustained, without any expert evidence, except as to a 
glucose tolerance test by Dr. Barker, four months after 
Appellant's treatments, . in which he noted a 4 hour low sugar, 
but did not conclude that Appellant had wrongfully diagnosed 
Mr. Adams. 
3. Lois Carter [Record 930]. Only one Dr. Pace, 
testified that two years after treatment by Appellant he tested 
for hypoglycemia and found it to be negative. 
4. Ruby Riddle [Record p. 176]. 
testimony 
diagnosis. 
was even offered to refute 
No 
her 
professional 
hypoglycemia 
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5. Mary Katsenavis fRecord p. l.!23]. The States Medical 
expert, Dr. Robert Maddock testified that the patient did have 
a form of reactive hypoglycemia; alimentary type. The 
committee further concluded, that Appellant used IRIDOLOGY, "an 
unproven and unaccepted method of diagnosis". 
State's own expert, Dr. Concors, testified that: 
However, the 
"I know you can diagnose arteriosclerosis with 
the use of the opthalmascope. They can be graded and 
looked at. Somebody that has training in that, which 
most general practitioners do • • • " 
Thus recognizing the use of irioology as a diagnostic method. 
It is almost unbelievable that based on this total lack of 
evidence, that one of the findings for revocation could be that 
Appellant "diagnosed hypoglycemia too often," that is 
comparable to concluding that a heart specialist diagnoses 
heart problems too often, without considering the fact that 
patients seek the Appellant's treatments because he has 
expertise and success in the treatemnt of low blood sugar 
(hypoglycemia) problems. 
POINT V 
The Supreme Court has erred by failing as a Court of 
Equity to assure the guarantees of due process of law to which 
Appellant is guaranteed by the constitution. 
At no time has Appellant been determined to have commited 
any act or practice that has harmed the public or any 
individual patient. The Supreme Court in Arizona Board of 
Medical Examiners v. Clark, 97 Ariz 205, 214, 398 P2d 908, 915 
(19n5), stated: 
"As applied in the licensing and revocation 
cases •unprofessional conduct' has been construed to 
include serious offense, such as intentional 
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violations of law or 
standards •• 
recognized professional 
"There must be a 'conscious and culpable act 
amounting to a willful design to do that which is 
denounced as an unlawful professional practice." 
This case has found no such circumstances. In this Court's 
August 22, 1983, decision it was stated that in respect to 
patient care the committee may set standards on a case-by-case 
basis. However, in this case the committee beyond patient 
treatment standards, chose to set standards, without prior 
notice, as to modes of practice which had been known by the 
Department for many years, and are in use by hundreds 6f DO's 
and MD's throughout the nation, including Chelation Therapy, 
laetrile, hypoglycemia, iridology. It is likened to a medical 
committee calling in a heart specialist who performs open heart 
surgery, now recognized to be 70% ineffective, and revoke that 
physicians license for using that mode of treatment. Appellant 
is here told that his professional life and right to earn a 
livlihood, and serve his hundreds of patients, is at an end 
because his mode of practice is not accepted by the mainstream 
medical profession, and because of some debateable 
circumstances involving treatment of eight patients, 8-12 years 
prior, is not acceptable to one Dr. Alan Concors, and a 
committee chairman (Dr. Greenwood) whom the statutory 
requirements barred from serving. 
This is clearly a ruling that would revoke the license of 
Pasteur, Freud, or any other who dared to pursue their medical 
talents in the face of mainstream medical theory opposition. 
The Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Rogers v. 
State Board of Medical Examiners, 371 So. 2d 1037 (1979), 
reasoned: 
"History teaches us that virtually all progress 
in science and medicine has been accomplished as the 
result of the courageous efforts of those members of 
the profession willing to pursue their theories in 
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the face of tremendous odds despite the criticisms of 
fellow practitioners. Copernicus was thought to be a 
heretic when he theorized that the Earth was not the 
center of the Universe. Banishment and prison was 
the reward four Pasteur was ridiculed for his theory 
that unseen organisms caused infections. Freud met 
only resistance and derision in pioneering the field 
of psychiatry. In our own era chiropractic treatment 
has been slow in receiving the approval of the other 
professions of the healing arts. We can only wonder 
what would have been the condition of the World today 
in the f i e 1 d o f med i c in e in pa rt i c u 1 a r h9 d those i n 
the midstream of their profession. been permitted to 
prohibit continued treatment and thereby impede 
progress in those and other fields of science and the 
healing arts •••• " 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant hereby petitions the honorable members of 
thi~;·co~r-~t,' :-to ,.cj.rant ·a· :-r.ehearing, to reconsider, this matter as 
to its constitutional impact on the lives of the public and the 
Appellant. No patient or member of the public has been 
endangered or harmed. Had proper standards been established as 
required by statute, and the Courts afforded a kind of judicial 
review afforded, with procedural and evidentiary safeguards to 
which he is entitled; then those minor problems involving 
methodology of handling patients could properly be handled by 
direction, instruction or even reprimand or probation, and not 
by a total revocation off the Appellants right to practice his 
profession because he is not in "the mainstream" of the 
profession. Because Appellent did not receive the kind of 
judicial review in the District Court as required by statute, 
but was tried based upon uncorroborated hearsay and innuendo, 
the revocation of Appellant's license is unconstitutional and 
clearly contrary to the statutes of this state. If the 
legislature has created uncertainty by creating conflicting 
laws, (ie. Osteopaths Licensing, vs. Medical Practice Act), why 
must Appellant and his patients be caused to pay the penalty. 
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This Court is duty bound to assure the constitutional 
safeguards of due process, regardless of what uninformed 
committees, Department of Registration, or prior counsel may 
have construed the law to be. 
Respectfully submitted this /7-- day of September, 198:?. 
1£1~/&JL_ 
M. RICHARD WALKER 
Attorney for Appellant 
Petitioner 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, to Steven G. 
Schwendirnan, Attorney for Respondent, at 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 8411.4, po~1.a gg~e p rep id on this 
1-Z-- day of September, 1983. Jh, /~./"""".__.,VJ<.-#----
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